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L Introduction
During my dozen years in commercial practice, I was first surprised
and then reassured by the number of times that I saw business people on
both sides of a transaction behave according to a standard higher than that
demanded by applicable law. I remember one incident with particular
clarity: the chief executive officer of a publicly held company refused to
take advantage of a contractual ambiguity and said that the interpretation
which favored the other party was what the parties originally intended.
This executive officer was in a difficult situation: the shareholders might
criticize the failure to take the last inch, and because the executive was a
significant shareholder, there was further personal incentive to consider
only the shareholder perspective.1
In contrast to this anecdote, consider the developing trend in unincor-
porated businesses. We have progressed (if that is the correct term) from
a very high standard of behavior applicable to partnerships toward the much
lower standard of many recent statutes applicable to unincorporated busi-
nesses such as partnerships or limited liability companies. Although some
business people are operating at a high standard, others are organizing a
concerted attack on that standard.
In contemplating the anecdote on the one hand, and this trend in
unincorporated businesses on the other, I am guided by two principles.
First, the standard of performance applicable in the business community is
a norm that lies on a continuum stretching from contract law's good faith
norm to trust law's fiduciary duty norm. The location on the spectrum is
1. As is the case with any anecdote, this is only an anecdote. All of us have less
heartwarming but more amusing stories of abuse. In addition, the chief executive's behavior
can be interpreted as thoroughly cynical: perhaps, in the context of a relatively closed
industry, this apparently principled behavior was no more than the only commercially
intelligent response. For example, consider the discussion of game theory and the prisoner's
dilemma. See ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 10-11 (1984) (discuss-
ing game theory and prisoner's dilemma). Or perhaps it was the chief executive's concern
for personal reputation that influenced the result. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 64 (1963) (discussing
how development of bad reputation can have detrimental effects on business).
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determined by the actor's conflict of interest and dominance. That is, in
contrast to the assertions of the lawyer-economists, the playing field is not
level and the standard of performance takes that into account as a practical
matter. Second, the business community's standard of performance on the
good faith spectrum is a reservoir of good will and trust. This reservoir is
the "commons" of the business arena. Consequently, it is not only defensi-
ble but appropriate that our legal system supports the standard. The law
should support - not erode - the standard of performance applicable to
unincorporated businesses.
These principles spawn corollaries. Because the standard of perfor-
mance is a norm, it can be supported, modified, or destroyed by concerted
action, including by legal action. Thus, law can support, and law can
destroy. When law supports, it pushes behavior that protects those who are
more vulnerable. As the law continues to push in that direction, it gains
momentum much like an epidemic. Then the pendulum swings past the
point of equilibrium. That is when the roles are reversed. The once
vulnerable party, now overly protected by preexisting law, becomes domi-
nant. Normally, the overarching norm of good faith will then reverse the
process. The evolving regulation of insider trading in securities presents
a clear illustration of the pendulum's slow but inexorable swing in the
direction of a higher standard of behavior during the better part of this
century, and of its apparent, recent reversal in direction.
As noted, however, the law not only can support a norm, it can
destroy one as well. The current trend in unincorporated businesses may
well be destroying the good faith norm in that sphere. If the trend erodes
the commons sufficiently, the good faith pendulum will no longer swing
back on its own and will further destroy the commons.
Part II of this Article defines the relevant standard of performance as
the good faith norm and describes the spectrum from contract law's good
faith norm to trust law's fiduciary duty norm. Part H focuses on the
relationship between the good faith norm and the law, including how the
law supports and modifies this norm. However, the law's ability to modify
the norm does not help us decide how the law should seek to affect the
good faith norm. Accordingly, Part IV discusses the analogy between the
good faith norm and the commons. For instance, a failure to protect the
good faith norm - by allowing the unincorporated businesses to veer from
a standard that accounts for the parties' relative dominance and conflict -
is a destruction of the commons. It is for this reason that law should
support the good faith norm. Therefore, we should reconsider the trend in
statutes applicable to unincorporated businesses.
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II. Good Faith Norm Is a Standard of Many Levels
When sociologists speak of norms, they generally are referring to
behavior patterns internalized by the participants.2 Because we cannot take
a CAT scan to determine the motivations for particular patterns of behavior,
we are relegated to observing objective manifestations. Therefore, sociolo-
gists would recognize a norm if, for example, a person behaves in a partic-
ular way despite lack of supervision. As lawyers, we are familiar with the
concept of objective intention;3 we are accustomed to determining the
deemed intention of a person based on outward manifestations.
For purposes of this Article, a norm is a pattern of behavior by a
significant number of participants that, given overt manifestations, appears
to have been internalized. The behavior can be explained by the proposi-
tion that the actor believes it preferable for whatever reason - be it self-
interest or a sense of morality - that those acts be accomplished.4 In
applying this framework to standards of performance, if business transac-
tion participants tend to behave in accordance with a standard higher than.
that required by law, the standard has been internalized and reflects a norm.
This behavior provides the best evidence that a norm has been created. To
the extent that I have found such evidence, I use it.5 In addition, I have
used standards long imposed by law as further evidence of an existing norm
because, even if the behavior is only to the level required by law, good
faith as a standard may still have been internalized: supervised performance
does not mean that compulsion is the only explanation. 6 For purposes of
this Article, a norm is overt behavior not incompatible with applicable law,
although I will emphasize those areas in which the evidence is particularly
strong that behavior has been internalized.
2. See JOHN C. TURNER, SOcIAL INFLUENCE 3 (1991) (defining norms).
3. See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand,
J.) (addressing importance of objective intentions in contract formation), af4'd, 201 F. 664
(2d Cir. 1912), and aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (2d ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1
cmt. a (1958) (addressing importance of objective manifestations in formation of agency
relationship).
4. Although the preference may be driven by a moral sense, see TURNER, supra note
2, at 3, it also may be driven by a desire to conform to a group to which the actor would
like to belong. See id. at 6 (using example of unemployed poor person seeking to behave
as if rich); see also Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
WIs. L. REv. 379, 398 (recognizing theoretic possibility of different motivations).
5. See infra Part II.A (discussing Professor Macaulay's 1963 research). See generally
Macaulay, supra note 1 (researching behavior in noncontractual business relations).
6. TURNER, supra note 2, at 44 (public compliance may include private change).
GOOD FAITH, NORMS, AND THE COMMONS
A. Good Faith Is a Norm in the Business Context
That there is a standard of behavior is reflected in the writings of legal
scholars who have been prolific in the business law arena. As we will see,
some scholars have confirmed that the standard of good faith exists by
documenting behavior of a standard higher than that required by law.
Others have merely affirmed the existence of a good faith standard. Still
others have expressly approved the existence of a minimum standard of
performance higher than opportunism. The best evidence of the norm's
existence would be an empirical study carefully teasing out the behavior of
business people when supervision is absent. The weakest evidence is the
view of students of commercial practice who articulate that they, as distin-
guished from actors in the commercial arena, have internalized a particular
behavior. I have found the following evidence persuasive in the aggregate.
Empiricists have confirmed the existence of a good faith standard. In
his famous 1963 article describing interviews with Wisconsin business
representatives, Professor Stewart Macaulay showed that, at least in the
particular context studied, businesses acted according to a standard that
exceeded mere good faith - that is, the businesses exceeded the standard
of performance legally required by the applicable contract. Analysis by
both the game theorists and the relational-contract theorists supports this
finding. Professor Macaulay's Wisconsin businesses appear to have been
located in a sufficiently confined geographic environment to give rise to
repeat business.' The game theorists emphasize that the classic prisoner's
dilemma channels the parties toward cooperation - at least as long as the
first party cooperates but remains ready to retaliate if the other does not
cooperate ("defects"), and as long as the parties perceive the iterations of
their relationship to be infinite.' Arriving at a similar conclusion by a
different route, Professor Ian Macneil describes the long-term contract as
7. Macaulay, supra note 1, at 55 n.3. Although all the businesses had contacts in
Wisconsin, it is not clear that they all worked together. However, Professor Macaulay
hypothesizes, as one possible explanation, that the businesses that performed beyond
contractual obligations desired to continue their relationships. See id. at 63. This is also
the explicit assumption of a prominent game theorist. See AXELROD, supra note 1, at 179
(this game theorist also assumes that superior performance evidences desire to continue
relationship). But see Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 465, 476 (suggesting that relationship will not sustain relational sanctions in endgame
situations).
8. Cooperation unravels in an endgame scenario. See AXELROD, supra note 1, at 10-
11; see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-98 (1996) (concern-
ing closed environments, particularly endgame situations).
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being "relational" and points out that the parties to such a contract behave
according to a standard higher than mere good faith.9
After an exhaustive study of case law in different business contexts,
Professor Robert Summers, an influential realist, has affirmed the existence
of a good faith standard. Describing good faith, Professor Summers speaks
of morality1" and finally is relegated to defining good faith in the negative:
Good faith is anything that is not bad faith. We know bad faith when we
see it, and Professor Summers certainly saw it in certain behavior censured
by commercial law.1
Finally, the lawyer-economists, too, recognize a minimum standard
and go on to approve the concept, albeit in their own vocabulary and
grudgingly. In their writings, they betray discomfort - although lawyer-
economists believe that persons who deal with each other should be able to
describe the relationship they want, they have not eliminated the concept of
an irreducible minimum standard of performance.12 Generally, lawyer-
economists assert that the parties to a particular transaction are in the best
position to value the exchange and, therefore, that the parties should be
permitted to opt out of even default obligations. 3 When asked to explain
9. See Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
340, 365 (1983) (discussing voluntary compliance with certain relational norms). Professor
Macneil refers to the complexity of the relationships, but his language implies that a relational
contract tends to be long-term. See id. at 363 (discussing complexity of relations and implying
that relations are long-term). He finds empirical support in, inter alia, Professor Macaulay's
work. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis.
L. Rnv. 483, 509-11 (drawing on Professor Macaulay's work). For application of this concept
to LLCs, see Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes: Likely Issues for LLCs, 66 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1043, 1060 (1995).
10. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 204-05 (1968) (discussing honesty,
good faith, and morality).
11. See id. at 196, 206 (giving example of commercial bad faith). For example,
Professor Summers specifically refers to "openly abusing the power to break off negotiations"
as an example of legally proscribed bad faith. Id. at 210, 212.
12. See infra note 14 (discussing potential for abuse in cooperative relationships); see
also Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989) (Bellacosa, J.)
(discussing termination of at-will employee). Although the case can be interpreted to suggest
that the New York Court of Appeals approves of arbitrary behavior, see Gary Minda,
Employment Law, 41 SYRACusE L. Rav. 265, 272-73 (1990), the decision can also be
explained as an illustration of New York's position that the at-will employment doctrine trumps
all rights of the employee, especially given Judge Bellacosa's dictum indicating that the
employee might have obtained a better result had oppression been argued. See also Gallagher
v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1989) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (opining that, because
shareholder-employee did not question his at-will status as employee, case's facts and issues
differed fundamentally from those in Ingle).
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 93 (4th ed. 1992)
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why they nevertheless favor a mandatory minimum standard of perfor-
mance, the lawyer-economists respond that the standard of good faith
prevents opportunism and that opportunism is indefensible because it is
inefficient. 4 Opportunism is inefficient in that it fails the Kaldor-Hicks
test: although the opportunist presumably does benefit, the victim of the
opportunism is harmed more than the opportunist benefits, and conse-
quently, society as a whole loses. 5 Because of this evidence and because
of my own experience as illustrated by the anecdote that opens this Article,
I agree that good faith standards represent a norm.
Therefore, we have seen that, in a business and commercial context,
a minimum standard of performance exists, it is practiced at a level higher
than that required by law, and it is viewed by at least some with expressed
approbation. Not only is there a norm, but it may well have been internal-
ized.
B. The Good Faith Norm Is on a Continuum from
Good Faith to Fiduciary Duty
Once we have established that good faith is a norm in the business
context, we must determine what we mean by "good faith." I contend that
good faith and fiduciary duty are on the same continuum. 6 For purposes
(arguing that, through finding parties' objective intentions, law should enforce parties'
determination of their own self-interest rather than seeking to impose third party's view of
efficiency).
14. See Market St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)
(suggesting that opportunism is not permissible behavior because costs to monitor are too
high); POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.8, at 117-18 (positing that law can deter opportunism by
imposing harsher sanctions on opportunistic breachor).
15. See OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 64-67
(1985) (explaining how opportunism increases transaction costs); Timothy J. Muris, Opportu-
nistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 524 (1981) (same). A
transaction achieves Kaldor-Hicks efficiency when the benefit to the winners would exceed
harm to the losers. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 84 (1988)
(defining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is distinguished from Pareto
superiority in that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency only requires the possibility of gain by the winners
after compensation to the losers. Pareto superiority requires that the winners gain advantage
without disadvantage to the nonwinners. See id. 84-86 (comparing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
to Pareto superiority); see also id. at 71-72 (defining Pareto efficiency terms); Deborah A.
DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transac-
tions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65, 71 (1994) (asserting that "opportunism" has varied meanings
in cases and academic writing, but that "[a]ll such meanings convey moral disapproval").
16. For a more detailed and complete explanation, see Claire Moore Dickerson, From
Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 955, 979-93 (1995). Others have raised the issue of the continuum. See Thomas Lee
Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C.
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of this discussion, I have reviewed the minimum standards imposed by law,
but I recognize that because law is necessarily prescriptive,17 law may also
force entirely noninternalized behavior. On the other hand, as described in
the introduction to Part 11, behavior that conforms to law may have been
internalized. Indeed, even behavior comporting with an aspirational statute
may have been internalized, but that is stretching the point more than
necessary. I do not use cases based on the Uniform Commercial Code's
(UCC) Article 2 precisely because Professor Karl Llewellyn arguably
drafted the Article 2 standards not to reflect marketplace realities, but rather
to propose standards that would take into account the relative power of the
parties8 Instead, I focus on common law as the better evidence of a true
L. REV. 273, 286 (1991) (attributing idea of continuum to Professor Coffee). Professor
Coffee has discussed good faith and fiduciary duty in the context of corporations and has
shown some consequences of applying these different doctrines originating from different
sources in the corporate setting. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The MandatorylEndbling Balance
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. Ry. 1618, 1653-64 (1989)
(examining similarities and differences between good faith and loyalty). However, although
Professor Coffee did reflect on circumstances in which the result could be explained either
in terms of good faith or in terms of fiduciary duty, see Coffee,, supra, at 1655 (citing
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 893), he did not consider the different levels of good faith. He focused on the
reasons why a corporation is not a contract and on why a pure fiduciary duty is not appro-
priate either. See Coffee, supra, at 1659-62 (disagreeing with contractarians). Others who
have considered the topic to varying degrees have emphasized procedural differences. See
Dickerson, supra, at 959 n.19 (discussing those who base continuum on procedural differ-
ences); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recog-
nizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1250-51
(1991) (distinguishing good faith from fiduciary duty on observation that burden of proof
shifts between parties when moving from good faith to fiduciary duty). Others have
emphasized historical differences. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules,
74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1225-26 (1995) (discussing separate growth, but opining that when
contract and fiduciary law are both present, fiduciary standards prevail). Yet others have
considered the existence of an intermediate standard to link up good faith and fiduciary duty,
perhaps thereby implying something akin to a continuum. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 642 (1983) (suggesting
limited solidarity constraint as intermediate standard). With thanks to Professor Lawrence
E. Mitchell for flagging this point to me, Judge Andrews, in his Meinhard dissent, included
dictum in doctrinal support of a continuum containing both a trust law duty and good faith
(although he was speaking only of express or implied trusts and not of purely contractual
relationships). See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 550 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
17. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs 2 (1991) (distinguishing
prescriptive rules from descriptive rules).
18. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REV.
873, 903-04 (1939) (opining that merchant law needed explicit form in present to build for
future); Karl N. Llewellyn, Through 7-tle to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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norm. As described below, the common law reflects the continuum that
contains good faith through fiduciary duty.19
In the context of commercial transactions, the lowest level of good
faith may mean nothing more than the minimum standard required to
prevent a contract from being illusory. In any event, this threshold pre-
vents malicious, opportunistic behavior.1t As the power of the transactor
(the fiduciary-analogue) becomes greater relative to the other party (the
beneficiary-analogue), and especially as the transactor's conflict of interest
increases, the standard of performance for the transactor moves along the
continuum toward fiduciary duty. For example, if the tenant as fiduciary-
analogue obtains an exclusive lease from the landlord as beneficiary-ana-
logue, pursuant to which the tenant is to pay rent based on the tenant's own
sales, the return on the landlord-beneficiary's investment will depend
entirely on the tenant's effort and ultimate success. The tenant, in its
capacity as the fiduciary-analogue under a percentage lease, has a signifi-
cant conflict of interest: instead of maximizing sales, it may seek to maxi-
mize profits to control its rental payment. Under these conditions, the
tenant as fiduciary-analogue is held to a standard that is higher than mere
good faith.2
159, 175-76 n.25 (1938) (arguing that dominance of completed bargain in merchant com-
munity ought not prevent courts from inquiring into bargaining process). But cf. Richard
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 621, 635 (1975) (suggesting that Llewellyn thought Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Article 2 would force courts to find law in commercial reality).
19. Cases either that predate the adoption of UCC Article 2 and its statutory predeces-
sors or that lie outside the reach of UCC Article 2 reflect the common law. Therefore,
because UCC Article 2 applies to the sale of goods, see U.C.C. § 2-102 (1992) (limiting
Article 2 to sales of goods), a transaction that is not for the sale of goods will, generally
speaking, be controlled by common law. In fact, the continuum exists in UCC Article 2 as
well as in the common law, see infra notes 20, 22 (discussing U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b),
-306(2) (1992)).
20. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 47 (opportunism); Muris, supra note 15, at
524 (opportunism); Summers, supra note 10, at 200 (common law). For sales of goods
between merchants, the UCC defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1992).
This "objective" definition generally is considered to be higher than the generally applicable
"subjective" definition. Id. § 1-201(19); see also Money Mart Check Cashing Ctr., Inc. v.
Epicycle Corp., 667 P.2d 1372, 1373 (Colo. 1983) (defining subjective good faith as very
low standard). This is logical to the extent that a nonmerchant who is acting can be
expected to be less in control than a merchant. See Dickerson, supra note 16, at 980 n.95
(discussing standard applied to nonmerchant). But see supra text accompanying note 18
(concerning Professor Llewellyn's aspirational tone for UCC Article 2). Common law may
therefore reflect realities more accurately than the UCC does.
21. See Stoddard v. Illinois Improvement,& Ballast Co., 113 N.E. 913, 915 (Ill. 1916)
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Note that if the tenant pays a substantial minimum rent in the context
of what is otherwise a percentage lease, the landlord as beneficiary-ana-
logue will be less vulnerable and the tenant as fiduciary-analogue will have
less incentive to focus on profits in lieu of sales. The fact that the tenant's
performance obligation slides back down to mere good faith when there is
a minimum rental payment evidences that it is the combination of relative
power and conflict that creates the higher standard.'
A corollary of the argument that the actor's conflict of interest and
relative dominance determine the precise location of the standard of perfor-
mance on the good faith and fiduciary duty continuum is that the parties
should not normally be able to opt out of a higher level of good faith
identified by the levels of conflict and dominance. In contrast, the
contractarians support opting out as a possibility in contract formation.
Further, because opting out is a contract law concept, the contractarians
apparently interpret opting out itself as requiring only the lowest level of
good faith.' I disagree. At a minimum, the level of good faith for opting
(lessee must quarry stone "diligently" when rent was based on stone removed by lessee);
Seggebruch v. Stosor, 33 N.E.2d 159, 161 (I11. App. Ct. 1941) (lessee must use "reasonable
diligence" in operating gas station when rent was based on amount of gasoline sold).
22. See Food Fair Stores v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (Md. 1964) (noting that
there is no heightened standard of good faith, despite exclusive lease, when there was
minimum rental); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 105 A.2d 580, 582-83 (Pa.
1954) (noting that real estate lease required mere good faith standard when there was
minimum rental). Essentially the same heightened standard applies in the case of sales of
goods under the UCC. See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (best efforts); see also Dickerson, supra note
16, at 983-84 (discussing higher "best efforts" standard applied to exclusive dealings).
23. Professor Ribstein has complained that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA) does not allow enough waiving of fiduciary duty and that the good faith and fair
dealing standard is too high. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Unyform Partnership Act:
Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 57 (1993). He claims that full waivability
has been possible under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). Id. (citing Wilson v. Button,
404 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1968); Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987); Covalt v.
High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App.
1981)). I disagree. Singer included an express agreement that the partners may compete
with the partnership, and the court approved the limiting of the partnership's scope to
whatever the partners placed in their partnership agreement. See Singer, 634 P.2d at 772.
However, the cases cited by Singer do not support the idea that any contract that is fair at
formation is enforceable. Wilson recognizes that Indiana's UPA § 18(f) expressly permits
partners to agree to salary payments. See Wilson, 404 F.2d at 309. In Hooper, the court
actually found a breach of fiduciary duty. See Hooper, 737 P.2d at 859-60. The Covalt
case is more difficult. The court allowed a 50% partner of the landlord-partnership, who
also had a 75% interest in the tenant-corporation, to block an increase in the rental payments
because the court found that the partners must have anticipated and therefore impliedly
approved a breach of that partner's fiduciary duty. See Covalt, 675 P.2d at 1003. The
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out should be at the level determined by conflict and dominance, and
because that can be determined with relevance only at the time of the
subject transaction, opting out should be - as it is for classic fiduciary
duty - only on an ad hoc basis.24
In turning to fiduciary duty, we start at the opposite end of the spec-
trum and work back to the middle.' If the continuum operates here, the
level of fiduciary duty owed should decrease as the fiduciary's relative
power and conflict decrease. The highest level of fiduciary duty is found
in classic trust law. The trustee is in charge of the corpus,' and in this
situation, the conflict is evident: because the trustee has no interest in the
benefits of the corpus, the more that the trustee can divert from the corpus,
the more advantageous for the trustee. In this circumstance, the trustee is
not to use its power for its own benefit: "The trustee is ... to administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary. "27
A trifle closer to good faith on the continuum is the partnership rela-
tionship. The actor-partner has power: a partner acting within the scope of
the business can bind the entire partnership and create personal liability for
all partners.' There is conflict, too. As the acting party, a partner can
create a transaction that benefits it more than - or even at the expense
of - its partners. On the other hand, the conflict is less than that for a
classic trustee because the partner is an owner of the partnership, and to the
other explanation for the court's approval of the apparent breach is that, rather than blessing
a blanket waiver, the court was balancing competing duties - the 75% shareholder of the
tenant, as an officer of the corporation, owed a fiduciary duty to try to keep the rent down.
But even from that perspective, the decision to absolve the recalcitrant partner seems wrong:
the fair rental value of the partnership's property was found to be 50% higher than the rent
being paid. See id. at 1001. Therefore, refusing to allow an increase in rent looks like a
clear breach of fiduciary duty by that recalcitrant partner. See Dickerson, supra note 16,
at 973-74 n.75 (criticizing Covalt decision).
24. See RESTATEMEN (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. a (1958) ("One employed as
agent violates no duty to the principal by acting for his own benefit if he makes a full
disclosure of the facts to an acquiescent principal and takes no unfair advantage of him.");
see also supra note 23 (arguing against position that opting out is already allowed).
25. See Dickerson, supra note 16, at 985-91 (analyzing continuum from fiduciary duty
end beginning with most stringent trust law rules, after analyzing continuum from contract
law end, beginning with threshold good faith).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1957).
27. Id. § 170(1).
28. See UNip. PARTNERsPAcr (1914) (UPA) § 9, 6 U.L.A. 400-01 (1995) (partner's
power to bind partnership); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994) (RUPA) § 301,
6 U.L.A. 33-34 (1995) (same); see also RUPA § 15 (partner's power to bind partners;
liability collection rules); id. § 306 (partner's power to bind partners); id. § 307 (liability
collection rules).
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extent that the partnership (the analogue of the trust corpus) does well, the
partner benefits. Even though the acting partner's fiduciary duty is gener-
ally less than that of a trustee,29 it rises again if the partner has unusual
power - for example, if the person acting is the managing partner.'
Again, the standard of performance on the fiduciary duty end of the spec-
trum should not be subject to opting out, except on an ad hoc basis and
after taking into account the standard to be applied to the transaction.3
The concepts underlying the standard's level are therefore the same at
both ends of the spectrum - the greater the acting party's power and
conflict of interest, the higher the standard.2 Conversely, as the acting
party's power and conflict are reduced, so is the standard of performance.
For purposes of this Article, the good faith norm is found at both ends of
the spectrum and at all points in between. Consequently, this good faith
standard applies whenever we are accustomed to hearing either "good faith"
or "fiduciary duty."
There is another point to emphasize. This good faith norm, at a level
determined by conflict and power, applies to contracts and to business
organizations - whether incorporated or not. It also applies to other
commercial relationships - even to insider trading. Because I am using
insider trading as an illustration, it is important to see that the good faith
norm is relevant in this context. Consider insider trading in the following
light: If we recognize the norm created by the nondisclosure (as opposed
29. The UPA reflects the dual role of the partner as a manager, see UPA §§ 9(1), 18(e),
(h), and as an owner, see id. § 18(a). RUPA expressly recognizes the impact of this role by
stipulating that a partner does not violate its fiduciary duty merely by furthering its own
interest. RUPA § 404(e). Even more bluntly, shareholders are allowed to act selfishly. See,
e.g., Harriman v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974);
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (explaining in
dicta that right to act selfishly is subject to fiduciary duty imposed on controlling, powerful
shareholder). But see Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 942, 954 (Ch. 1993)
(dicta); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975).
30. See Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1l. App. Ct. 1983) (managing partners
held to heightened duty); see also Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership
Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1988) (discussing heightened duty for managing
partner).
31. See supra text accompanying note 24 (arguing that opting out should be allowed only
on ad hoc basis and only if level of conflict and dominance permit).
32. As described in Dickerson, supra note 16, at 993-1000, I believe that the extent of
harm, in particular "permitted harm," to the other party is also relevant in determining the
level for the standard of performance. However, for purposes of this discussion, the combina-
tion of power and conflict is a sufficient explanation. For an interesting take on the
dependence-dominance structure of fiduciary duty, see William W. Bratton, Game Theory and
the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 139 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
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to the misrepresentation) component of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) to be broader than the classic command
to "disclose or abstain," we can view the Section as prohibiting abuse by
a dominant participant. Under the 1934 Act, the insider33 with material
nonpublic information is perceived as being in a dominant position vis-a-vis
other existing and potential investors in the company. The use of material
nonpublic information is an abuse at the expense of relatively vulnerable
investors. In more general terms, the insider has violated the relevant
standard of performance, which in any event is no lower than contract law
good faith.' The 1934 Act, therefore, merely imposes a familiar standard
located on the good faith continuum,35 but applies it to a new setting:
dealing in securities.
III. The Good Faith Norm, Acting Synergistically with Law,
Evolves as a Pendulum
In this Part, I will show that because the standard of performance on
the continuum is a norm, it can be modified by norm entrepreneurs.36 So,
how does law operate as a tool of the norm entrepreneurs?
Law can define and encourage behavior desired by the norm entrepre-
neurs, and it can do so by changing the risks and rewards.37 It can support
33. The same analysis would apply to any Section 10(b) defendant, including a defendant
who is not a classic insider, such as a tippee or a defendant in a misappropriation cause of
action.
34. Scienter is the Section 10(b) standard. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976). Scienter for these purposes includes recklessness. See Rolf v. Blyth Eastman
Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1978). Although scienter is defined in
contrast to negligence, see Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201, and is thus more a tort than a
commercial concept, this does not mean that the dominance/conflict aspects of the good faith
continuum are inapplicable. A person trading on or tipping material inside information with
scienter is benefiting from the dominance created by the information and is conflicted because
that person is able to benefit personally from the information.
35. See Dickerson, supra note 16, at 978-93 (discussing how good faith and fiduciary
duty are on same continuum). Even if good faith and fiduciary duty are not on the same
continuum, both are existing norms.
36. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,
2029-31 (1996) (discussing "norm entrepreneurs").
37. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994) (primary rules create
duties); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-
proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1643, 1654 (1996) (dis-
cussing Hart, who observed that custom lacks "secondary rules," i.e., "rules controlling
rules"); see also SCHAUER, supra note 17, at 2 (discussing prescriptive rules). The rewards
can be wholly intangible, such as relieving tension by joining a group that is similarly (miser-
ably) situated. See TURNER, supra note 2, at 30. More to the point with respect to the rela-
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an existing norm by increasing the cost of defection. Law can also change
the patterns of behavior by creating norms. Note that norm entrepreneurs
who create a norm simultaneously destroy another; the law is an effective
tool for both. Once a pattern of behavior exists, the law can also work to
expand its application into new arenas. This is the subject of Part III.A.
Part III.B describes how law affects norms in a manner akin to an epi-
demic: little effort is needed to create a huge effect if the norm has not been
internalized; far more effort is needed if the norm has been internalized.
Finally, Part I.C discusses how, as the pressure to modify the behavior
becomes more successful, it causes the behavior to overshoot the mark. A
law intended to protect and diffuse the good faith norm can swing past the
point of equilibrium, to the effect that the law is ultimately protecting those
who, thanks to the law's support, have ceased to be vulnerable and have
become dominant. It is at this point that the very norm of good faith
demands that the pendulum swing be reversed. In contrast, it is less clear
that an overarching norm of good faith will support a reversal of defection,
precisely because defection will have at least partially destroyed the good
faith norm.
A. Law Can Support, Expand, or Reverse an Established Norm
If norms were entirely self-enforcing, laws to enforce them would be
redundant. It is in part because even internalized norms are not wholly
self-enforcing that law is necessary. The law acts as a sheep dog, keeping
down the defections. Law can also be used by norm entrepreneurs to
change the direction of the flock; in that case, the sheep dog reverses a
norm that exists in the relevant arena, either by expanding the reach of a
norm that already exists outside the arena or by pure norm creation. After
describing the law as a supporter and an expander of norms and as a tool
of norm defectors, I will apply these lessons to the good faith continuum
in the context of unincorporated businesses.
1. Law Can Support an Established Norm
When good faith is a norm that has been fully internalized, the norm
will be largely self-executing.3" Despite such a situation, however, certain
members will have incentive to defect unless laws restrain them.
tionship of norms to the law, by increasing predictability, law reduces ambiguity and increases
the likelihood of conformity. See id. at 44-45; see also Bratton, supra note 32, at 165.
38. See TURNER, supra note 2, at 144 (noting that, by implication from definition of
normative influence, internalized norm will be largely self-executing).
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If the environment relating to particular conduct is neither infinitely
iterative nor relational, it will not be conducive to self-executing norms:
even if most members of a community conform to a particular standard of
performance because they have internalized the norm, some member of the
community or a person from outside the community may recognize that
acting opportunistically will be to that person's immediate, short-term
benefit.39  That conclusion is compatible with the learning of the game
theorists and the relational contract theorists: the convergence of interests
that leads to cooperation occurs when there is an infinitely iterative or a
truly relational context.' But whether or not there is an iterative or rela-
tional relationship, the law can increase the incentive to cooperate by
penalizing defection, thus increasing the relative benefit of cooperation. A
law that supports the good faith norm increases the likelihood of the other
party's cooperation and thereby reduces agency costs by reducing the need
for monitoring.4 Note that the impact of law in support of good faith
should be particularly noticeable when the good faith norm has not been
fully internalized because, in that situation, compliance normally would
depend greatly on surveillance.42 By changing the calculation of any
potential defector, therefore, the law can serve very effectively both as a
stick and as a carrot. The law effectively changes the rational equation to
make cooperation more attractive and defection more costly.43
Commercial situations often are both imperfectly iterative and imper-
fectly relational. The classic insider trading situation is a good illustra-
tion.44 The insider either sells securities of the insider's corporation be-
cause the insider possesses nonpublic information to the effect that the price
of the securities will fall, or buys those securities based on information
39. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 47 (defining opportunism as "self-interest
seeking with guile"); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 128-30 (1992) (some
dealers defect even in close-knit, iterative environment).
40. See supra Part I.A (discussing empirical and theoretical research into conditions for
cooperation); see also Bratton, supra note 32, at 166 (considering relationship between game
theory and norms).
41. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel . Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1424 (1989) (discussing agency costs).
42. TURNER, supra note 2, at 144.
43. See infra Part EII.B (noting that sheep dog role of law is so important because
defectors can destroy norm).
44. For purposes of this Article, "insider trading" is trading that violates Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, not merely any trading by an "insider." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994)).
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indicating that the price of the securities will rise. If the trade is effected
in the public markets, the insider in its private capacity will typically have
neither a repetitive nor a long-term relationship with the other party to the
trade. Barring a law to the contrary, it is in such a context that the insider
will have incentive not to cooperate,45 that is, an incentive to act opportu-
nistically. Here the law can impose penalties on defectors to raise the cost
of defection and increase the relative benefits of cooperation.
2. Law Can Expand the Application of a Norm into New Arenas, and
Such Expansion Includes Defection from the Old Norm
An existing norm can expand into a new arena.47 In this circumstance,
the new behavior expected by the new law may look like a new norm, but
may be only an application of an existing norm to a new set of circum-
stances.' For example, before the stock market crash of 1929 the majority
view was that the information a director obtained as a corporate insider was
a perquisite of the position as director.49 Consequently, it was entirely
45. Even the empiricists' reputational constraints, see Macaulay, supra note 1, at 63,
would be less persuasive in a one-shot or nearly one-shot transaction.
46. See supra note 15 (discussing lawyer-economists' view of opportunism).
47. This Article focuses on expansion into a new topic area, but the expansion also
could be into a new community. For example, it could be the introduction of arbitrageurs
to the good faith norm, in the form of a rejection of insider trading. Arguably, the commu-
nity of arbitrageurs has not adopted that norm. See Laurence Zuckerman, Arbitragers Are
Back in Action These Days, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 1994, at B6 (arbitrageurs are
members of secretive club). That there is a different norm for the arbitrageurs' community
is evidenced by the fact that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been
determinedly after them for insider trading. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro,
Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 149, 153 n.8 (1990) (discussing regulation of arbitrageurs); see also JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THMVEs 30-31 (1991) (discussing change of arbitragers from low-risk,
price-discrepancy traders to high-risk traders speculating on information about takeovers);
Ann Monroe & Ed Leefeldt, Insider Trading Case Appears to Damp Wall Street Gossip,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 1986, at 2 (arbitrageur impliedly admits that there is much trading
on inside information). Information is the core of the business. For example, Martin
Siegel, then of Kidder Peabody and later-a prominent insider trading defendant, reportedly
"assumed" at first that arbitrage worked on "tips, hints, nods ... [stopping] just short of
the actual passing of inside information," and that the reliability of the "tip" would be
independently assessed by the recipient. STEWART, supra, at 155. In 1984, Siegel did not
stop "just short" and traded on inside information with Goldman Sach's arbitrage partner,
Robert Freeman. Id. at 156-61.
48. See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2043 (discussing how law can bring recognized
norm from one area and use it to replace disliked norm in another area).
49. I am assuming that the precrash norm tolerated abuse by the dominant, as one
would expect to some degree from a legal system awakening from Social Darwinism. See
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acceptable for a director to use that information when trading in the
corporation's securities. 5°' After the passage of the 1934 Act, such trading
on material, nonpublic information became prohibited by Section 10(b).
Nevertheless, it was not until the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that a recognition
of Section 10(b)'s reach seemed to enter the mores.5' For example, one of
the named defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur was a senior engineer who was
proudly described in Life magazine by the following caption next to his
smiling photograph: "Kenneth Darke, a Texas Gulf engineer, supervised
first strike, now plays the market on his own."52
Perhaps this engineer was unaware of the standards applicable to his
actions because he did not belong to the community of business mavens?
That cannot be the full explanation. A very sophisticated businessman,
Thomas S. Lamont, found himself caught in the same discontinuity between
law and norms when he gave information about Texas Gulf Sulphur Com-
pany to another company, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. 3 Today, we
generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed.
1955) (analyzing Social Darwinism in United States); William J. Woodward, Jr., Contrac-
tarians, Community, and the Tort of Interference With Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103,
1109 n.20 (1996) (discussing late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century idea of Social
Darwinism, which held that upper classes were upper classes because of superior fitness).
Thus, the precrash era was not merely a problem of perception such that the insiders were
viewed as more vulnerable than the public and, therefore, to be supported in conformity
with the good faith norm. Rather, the insiders were privileged and deserved to be.
50. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660-63 (Mass. 1933) (finding nothing
wrong with director trading on insider information in public market); WILLIAM L. CARY &
MELvIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 814 (7th ed., unabr., 1995) (discussing precrash
view of insider trading).
51. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Billion-Dollar Plunge in the Bush, LIFE, May 15, 1964, at 36, 38.
53. See Thomas Lamont, Banker, 68, Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1967, at 1.
Thomas S. Lamont was a son of a J.P. Morgan founder, a partner of the firm in his own
right, and at the same time, Vice Chairman of the Board of Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company. Id.; Texas Guf Sulphur Co. Bought in April by 2 Officers, Director, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1964, at 49. He was also on the Texas Gulf Sulphur board. Id. Earlier on the
day when Texas Gulf Sulphur granted a full press conference to disclose an extraordinary
mineral strike, the Texas Gulf Sulphur directors were informed of the strike. Id. Presum-
ably focusing on his fiduciary duty as director of Morgan Guaranty, Mr. Lamont telephoned
the head of Morgan Guaranty's trust department to tell him to "look at the broad tape."
Eileen Shanahan, S.E.C. Insider Suit Names Texas Gulf Sulphur Aides, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1965, at 1 (discussing Lamont's actions); Conversation with Professor Robert
Boyden Lamb, New York University Stem School of Business (June 21, 1996) (discussing
Lamont's intent). This call occurred ten minutes after the end of the press conference.
Shanahan, supra, at 1. The SEC did not claim that Mr. Lamont had benefited personally
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understand that Mr. Lamont risked liability as a tipper.' At the time,
according to personal conversations with his family, Mr. Lamont was
focused only on his fiduciary duty as a director of Morgan Guaranty.
Convinced that his behavior had been correct, Mr. Lamont died not long
after his trial, still confused by the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) treatment of his actions.'
The government, including the SEC and the Justice Department,
continued to push their efforts in norm entrepreneurship. 6 During the
takeover feast of the 1980s, there was ample opportunity to use material
nonpublic information. A person who knows in advance that the raider will
make a tender offer for a target has virtually certain knowledge that the
target's shares will rise upon the tender offer's announcement. This cer-
tainty takes fair play out of the equation. Before passage of the 1934 Act,
insiders were dominant'- they used information that was not theirs' for
their own benefit and at the expense of the public.58 Even before the
from the call to Morgan Guaranty. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Officer Accused by SEC of
Profiting by Inside Data, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1965, at 3. However, Morgan Guaranty
purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur shares, and the SEC pursued Mr. Lamont.
54. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (defining tipper and what it is
to benefit from tipped information). Ten minutes after the Texas Gulf Sulphur press confer-
ence, the information was not yet public. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971). The district court ultimately dismissed the charges against
Mr. Lamont because his actions had occurred after the press conference. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In other words, even district
court Judge Bonsal got it wrong. On appeal, the Second Circuit chastised the district court
for that dismissal. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir. 1968).
As further indication of Mr. Lamont's naivet6 when his actions are viewed with 20/20
hindsight, and as further indication of the district court's similar confusion, note that the
charges against Mr. Lamont were dropped even though there was a fairly clear indication
of personal benefit; he had actually purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur shares for his family two
hours after the press conference. Mining Insiders Explain Deals, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16,
1964, at 30.
55. See supra note 53 (discussing Mr. Lamont's life and death).
56. This is not to denigrate pre-Texas Gulf Sulphur enforcement efforts, including the
SEC's administrative decision in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Rather, it
is a recognition that Texas Gulf Sulphur - because of the extreme visibility of the mineral
strike - brought the issue of insider trading into the public consciousness to a degree that
had not been the case before. In Cady, Roberts, the defendant was a stockbroker. See id.
at 907-08. In Texas Guy'Sulphur, the defendants included a senior official of a commercial
bank and an engineer. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing Texas Gulf
Sulphur defendants).
57. In this example, the information belonged to the raider.
58. Persons who, in ignorance, sell a target's shares before the tender offer becomes
public lose an opportunity precisely because of the buyer's use of undisclosed inside
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1980s, buying a target's securities before the announcement while in
possession of such information was unambiguously a Section 10(b) viola-
tion. We did not need Texas Gulf Sulphur to know that. 9 The problem
was that persons with access to information about an impending takeover
assumed that they would not be caught, and therefore, they traded despite
Section 10(b)'s prohibition. An implication is that the don't-trade-on-
inside-information norm still had not been fully internalized, and therefore,
the government fought back with criminal prosecutions. The defendants in
the criminal cases of the 1980s included an investment banker who salted
away almost $12 million' as well as a financial printer's employee who
earned only about $29,000.61 Implicit in the government's showmanship
when it hauled traders off the trading floor in handcuffs was the recognition
that the norm still had not been internalized. In an effort to get its message
across, the government used all available weapons, from financial penalties
to incarceration, with shame somewhere in the mix.62
information. They will suffer this loss whether or not they can be identified and despite the
Supreme Court's rejection of the parity-of-information doctrine for nondisclosure cases. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980) (rejecting parity-of-information
doctrine because doctrine eliminates essential element of specific relationship between
parties).
59. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC penalized a broker who
traded in securities (for his own account and accounts of others) while in possession of
material nonpublic information. Texas GufSulphur was more difficult because the material-
ity of the information was questionable given that test borings do not predict ultimate results
with certainty and because the nonpublic nature of the information was also questionable
given the timing of certain trades as compared with the timing of public disclosure. See
supra note 54 (discussing Texas Gulf Sulphur).
60. DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTRoY MICHAEL MaiLKEN
AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 101 (1995).
61. Bryan Burrough, After the Fall: Fates Are Disparate for Those Charged with
Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 1; see Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
Chiarella was the first case of criminal liability imposed on a purchaser for Rule lob-5
nondisclosure liability. The defendant's sentence was one year in prison, suspended except
for one month and a five-year probation. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1373, 1378 (2d Cir. 1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with imposition of liability,
especially criminal penalties), rev'd in part, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see also Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 235 n.20 (discussing defendant's sentence).
62. The point has been made that law cannot influence norms if the public is unaware
of the law. See Hyde, supra note 4, at 407-08. Some governmental efforts publicize the
law. During the administration of then U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, three top traders
were placed against the wall, frisked on Kidder, Peabody & Co.'s trading floor, then led
away in handcuffs. Stephen J. Adler et al., Litigator's Legacy: After Advancing Use of
Racketeering Law Giuliani Eyes Politics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1989, at Al. All of the
indictments against two of the traders and most against the third trader were eventually
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Judicial activity was not limited to entertaining criminal prosecutions
for insider trading. The courts also broadened the categories of potential
defendants by pursuing the misappropriation theory. Chief Justice Burger's
famous dissent in Chiarella v. United States3 was the first Supreme Court
opinion to discuss the misappropriation theory. Seven years later, the
Court granted the theory a four-to-four affirmance.' Meantime, four cir-
cuit courts of appeals have adopted this expansive theory of insider-trading
liability:' the Second,' the Third,67 the Seventh,6" and the Ninth.69 The
misappropriation theory asserts that a person can violate Section 10(b)'s
nondisclosure provisions if the person has traded in securities using material
nonpublic information in violation of a duty owed. The duty, however,
need not be owed to the securities' issuer.7" It could, for example, be owed
to an employer and, because misappropriation cases often arise in the con-
text of a takeover, the employer in turn would owe a duty to the raider, not
the issuer-target. 7 In the more aggressive cases, although the employee-
tossed out, see John Riley, Cleared Trader Takes a Swipe at Giuliani, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23,
1989, at 47, but the shaming had been done. However, Michael Milken's shaming may
have been less effective. A few years after Milken was sentenced to jail for multiple
felonies, the business school of the University of California at Los Angeles hired him, see
Francis X. Clines, An Unfettered Milken Has Lessons to Teach, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1993,
at 1, as did Ted Turner, see Peter Truell, Turner Said to Defend Milken's Advisory Fee,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1995, at D5. Shame has been the subject of much discussion. See
JOHN BRArrHwArrE, CRIME, SHAME & REINTEGRATION 75-76 (1989) (discussing shame);
AmrrAI ETZONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrrY 141 (1993) (same); Sunstein, supra note 36,
at 2029-30 (same). Shame has been applied as a political tool. See Morning Edition (NPR
radio broadcast, June 10, 1996), available in 1996 WL 2814914 (Boston is shaming johns
by having them do physical clean-up in Boston's red-light district). This is social influence
at work. See TURNER, supra note 2, at 34-36.
63. 445 U.S. 222, 239 (1980).
64. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1987). Because it was a 4-4
affirmance, Carpenter has no precedential value. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977).
65. See infra Part III.C (discussing recent Fourth and Eighth Circuit decisions
restricting misappropriation theory).
66. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
67. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on remand,
808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), and cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
68. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995).
69. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990).
70. Consequently, the defendant need not be a director, officer, or other classic insider
of that issuer. See cases cited infra note 71.
71. As to takeover scenarios, see SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995) (with
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defendant would owe a duty to the employer, the employer's duty would
be hard to f'md.'
The legislative branch also weighed in during the 1980s. Prior to
passage of the 1934 Act, and again during the heyday of the 1980s take-
overs, the government was concerned that the insiders were dominant and
were abusing the public. With the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act (ITSA) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
(ITSFEA), 3 the norm entrepreneurship of the government has turned the
tide massively against insiders, at least in certain comers of the securities
industry.74 Trading on inside information is no longer a perquisite of the
job; since ITSA, insiders are at risk for more than three times their illegal
profits - a far worse result for them than mere disgorgement of profits.
Since ITSFEA, a person who trades within a short time of another's trade
that had used material nonpublic information in violation of Section 10(b)
can sue the alleged violator in a private cause of action.75 Before ITSFEA,
respect to Xidex Corporation securities); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990);
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on remand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d
Cir. 1986); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); and United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
72. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), 4'd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987) (affirmed 4-4) (not takeover scenario).
73. Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (1994)) (amending
Sections 21(d) and 32 of 1934 Act by adding treble damages and increasing criminal
sanctions); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA), Pub. L. No.
100-704, sec. 5, § 20A, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680-81 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1 (1994)) (amending 1934 Act by adding Section 20A which provides for private
cause of action in nondisclosure cases).
74. See generally H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions,
35 J.L. & EcON. 149 (1992) (breaking securities industry history into pre-Chiarella,
Chlare//a to 1TSA, and post-ITSA; noting that generally trading decreases before earnings
announcements and takeovers).
75. See 1TSFEA, sec. 5, § 20A, 102 Stat. at 4680-81 (amending 1934 Act by adding
Section 20A private right of action). Because only those who trade "contemporaneously"
with the insider traders can be private plaintiffs, the meaning of that word also will indi-
rectly determine the amount of damages that the unsuccessful defendant pays. See id.
sec. 5, § 20A(b)(1), 102 Stat. at 4680-81. According to Section 20A's legislative history,
the four-day period of Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) describes a
contemporaneous trade, but the one-month period of Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1976), does not. See generally H.R. REP. No. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043. The House report states that the bill does not define a contemporane-
ous trade, but it then cites, inter alia, to Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648
F.2d 88 (1981). H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6064. Wilson considers a trade within four days, but not within one month, to be
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the primary hope of unhappy complainants was for an SEC investigation of
the alleged violators. Now the complainants, with their lawyers, can dig
in directly.76
Note that, as the law expands the norm of good faith into new catego-
ries of transactions, a preexisting norm is being destroyed and replaced.
That is, the expansion of the anti-insider-trading norm presupposes that the
new law encourages defection from the preexisting, pro-insider-trading
norm. The law's introduction of the new norm into a particular context is,
to the extent successful, necessarily the reversal of an existing norm. Thus,
it is a government-supported defection from that existing norm, as well as
a government-supported expansion of the new norm.
3. The Support, Expansion, and Defection Roles of Law
Applied to the Good Faith Norm's Evolution in the Context of
Unincorporated Businesses
Norm entrepreneurs have made a similar effort to modify norms in the
context of unincorporated businesses. Here, the effort has been to change
the good faith norm so that an actor's dominance and conflict would no
longer determine the standard's level on the good faith spectrum. When the
story starts, partnership law contains a high standard of performance. We
are all familiar with Justice Cardozo's famous formulation in Meinhard v.
Salmon:' A fiduciary is "held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive.""8 During the 1970s, this standard was in such good graces that
the courts expanded a modified version into the arena of closely held
corporations.79 Then came the reversals.
contemporaneous. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94-95. Note that Section 20A(d) expressly states
that Section 20A is nonexclusive. See generally CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 50, at 883-
84.
76. This represents either the creation of a new norm, see infra Part II.A.3, or
enforcement of a norm by modifying the actor's self-interest, see supra Part mrr.A.2.
77. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
78. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). For a discussion of the
power of this language, see Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary
Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 954, 965-66 (1993).
79. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-62 (Mass.
1976) (applying partnership standards to stockholders of close corporation); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975) (same); Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (same). However, this duty
is modified by the Wilkes and Smith cases, which allow the duty to be waived if there is a
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First, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (RUPA) was
drafted to provide for a lowering of the mandatory minimum standard of
performance' and to import into partnership law the lawyer-economists'
contractarian perspective that had been evolving in the world of incorpo-
rated businesses.8 Subsequent to RUPA, the states began to adopt limited
liability company (LLC) statutes, many of which track the RUPA concept
of an unwaivable core of duties. Other states enacted LLC statutes that
provide for waivers, and yet others do not refer to fiduciary duties at all.'
This use of the law can be viewed in one of two ways. It may reflect
a concerted defection from the good faith norm as reflected by the spec-
legitimate business interest. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; Smith, 422 N.E.2d at 801, 803.
Needless to say, the contractarians are prepared to go even further. See Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (discussing in dicta
contractual waivers of disclosure obligations).
80. RUPA §§ 103, 404. Although RUPA went through many iterations, a fairly
complete draft was in circulation by 1992. Four years later, as of December 1996, only
eleven states have adopted RUPA (Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming). In addi-
tion, Texas has adopted revisions based on RUPA. Of these eleven plus one, only eight
have a fiduciary-duty section that tracks the opting-out provisions of Sections 103 and 104
of RUPA. Montana and Wyoming apparently have expanded the opting-out powers, while
Florida may have further limited opting out. See also supra note 23 (concerning RUPA as
attenuation of fiduciary duty).
81. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate
Concepts: Fiduciay Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv.
111 (1993) (discussing contractarian perspective pervasive in RUPA).
82. See Wayne M. Gazur, -The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited
Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 LAw & CoNmP. PROBs. 135, 154-56 (Spring 1995) (discus-
sing opting out with mandatory threshold). As of December 1996, Hawaii, South Carolina,
Vermont, and West Virginia have adopted statutes based on the UNiF. LIMrrED LiABiLrry
COMPANY ACT (ULLCA), 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995), which in turn, approaches fiduciary
duties in a manner patterned on RUPA. See Gazur, supra, at 152-54 (waivers); id. at 148-
51 (no express standards); see also Caryl B. Welborn, Avoiding PersonalLiability to Co-
Members, Partners and Third Parties: How Far Can the Partnership or Operating Agreement
Go?, 249 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 323, 329-30 (1996). Limited partnerships fall back on the general
partnership law with respect to the partners' fiduciary duties. REViSED UNIP. LIMITED
PARE lsI,Acr (1985) § 1105, 6A U.L.A. 302 (1995). Many states have adopted other
unincorporated business forms, notably the limited liability partnership. However, the
statutes authorizing these forms are often rudimentary; they provide the owners with limited
liability, but the vast majority of other topics are still covered by general partnership law.
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN. L.
REv. 319 (1996) (discussing new limited liability forms). With regard to the effect of
statutes on the good faith norm, it is especially likely that the relevant public will know the
statutory standard when a business organization can be formed only by a filing, because it
is especially likely that a lawyer will be retained. See supra note 62 (recognizing that law
has to be known if it is to influence).
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trum8 because it permits application of a standard that lies near the good
faith end of the spectrum without taking into account either the actor's
conflict of interest or the level of the actor's dominance over the other
party. Another view is that the contractarian norm entrepreneurs who have
sought passage of RUPA and the LLC statutes support the good faith norm
and believe that the statutes they propose similarly support that norm.
Because the lawyer-economists emphasize freedom of contract,' they
consider power to be relatively evenly distributed between parties involved
in a business formation.' If the lawyer-economists have an accurate
perception, it would be appropriate to apply a standard of performance that
lies more on the good faith end of the spectrum, rather than toward the
fiduciary duty end. My disagreement is based on a belief that lawyer-
economists are using the wrong scale. I see uneven, hilly terrain where
they see a level playing field. Because they are considering only sophisti-
cated participants, the lawyer-economists' scale may be too large and too
selective: 86 if the scale is large enough, certain small patches of even the
Himalayas will look flat. Or perhaps the scale is too small because they are
considering society as a generic whole: if the scale is small enough, such
as a snapshot from outer space, even the Himalayas in their entirety will
look flat.
Because I see hills, I see relative dominance and vulnerability - that
is, circumstances that require the application of the good faith spectrum.'
The contractarian support of broad opting out is inconsistent with this good
faith continuum. Therefore, even though a difference of perception can
explain the contractarians' efforts in favor of RUPA and the LLC form,
those efforts act as a norm defection.
83. See infra Part lfl.B (noting that defection from norm can destroy that norm).
84. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71-72 (1990) (concluding that
freedom of contract is preferable to mandatory terms for business associations); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,445-
46 (1993) (concluding that fiduciary duties are merely presumptive contract terms).
85. Ribstein, supra note 23, at 58-59 (emphasizing that partners "often negotiate in
detail or are participating in sophisticated, idiosyncratic tax-motivated deals"). Presumably,
deals will be less sophisticated now that the check-the-box regulations will replace traditional
entity-classification. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, -3 (1997) (as amended by
T.D. 8697, 1997-2 I.R.B. 11).
86. Ribstein, supra note 23, at 58-59.
87. See supra Part ll.B (observing good faith norm on continuum and noting that
position on continuum is determined by conflict and dominance).
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B. How Law Is a Barrier to Defection and an Engine for Expansion
In this Article, I have assumed and shown by examples that norms can
be changed by law. The principle is that if we take a large enough club,
we can - at least to an extent - bludgeon behavior and, ultimately,
expectations. Advertisers try to do it, politicians try to do it, and legisla-
tures try to do it. But the underlying question remains: How does the club
work? The same analysis applies to the support of an existing norm, to the
expansion of such a norm, and to the converse, defection. We still do not
know how much force the law will need to be an effective barrier to
defection or an effective engine for expansion, and unless we have some
inkling of the answer to that question, we cannot know when the law will
be effective for either purpose. That is, we cannot know how large the
club must be nor how often to apply it.
Recent work in sociology suggests that the effects of norm defection
or expansion are nonlinear. That is, norms are sticky at the outer edges,
but as they come close to a point of equilibrium (the "tipping point"), a tiny
incremental effort will have a dramatic effect.' For example, if a crime
wave is at the tipping point because the relevant population is aging, it may
take a very small effort - eradication of the so-called quality-of-life crimes
such as loitering - to effect a dramatic lowering of the crime rate. 9
Similarly, if norm entrepreneurs start the shift away from the norm of good
faith, they can change the norm more easily if it is near the tipping point.
Even if it is not, by persevering, norm entrepreneurs can ultimately create
an avalanche, an epidemic. 90
Game theory also supports the view that, in a complex, multi-party
environment, a sufficiently determined and sufficiently large group of
objectors can successfully invade a territory of cooperators. 9' Once defec-
tion begins, others may have the incentive to defect as well, in an accelerat-
88. See generally Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, NEW YORKER, June 3, 1996,
at 32-38 (discussing theory of tipping point).
89. Id. at 38.
90. The concept of an epidemic has been used expressly to describe social ills. A
direct comparison is drawn between a situation in which, just before becoming healthy
again, one sick person infects one healthy person, and a situation in which, because each
ill person meets 10% more potential victims, one in ten sick persons infects two healthy
persons, instead of just one. The first situation is stable; the second is an epidemic because
of the compounding of victims. See id. at 36-37 (epidemic and crime wave). See generally
H. Range Hutson et al., The Epidemic of Gang-Related Homicides in Los Angeles County
from 1979 Through 1994, 274 JAMA 1031 (1995) (epidemic and vandalism).
91. AXELROD, supra note 1, at 162-63 ("meanies" colonize if "shadow of the future"
is weak).
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ing pattern. 2 In other words, the opportunists can absolutely reverse the
norm of good faith.
What does this tell us about the role of law in the context of the good
faith norm? Law can effectively reduce the number and therefore the
effectiveness of ad hoc defectors, thereby protecting the good faith norm
from being destroyed by random opportunists. As noted earlier, the law
can make defection more costly to the defectors and, therefore, cooperation
relatively more attractive. The epidemic of defection is stopped by pushing
the mass of defectors back from the tipping point, in part by reducing their
number below the critical size necessary to be effective in reversing the
norm.
Yet the law can take a more affirmative role as well. It can force an
existing norm into a new arena, and the same analogy to epidemics applies.
In the case of expansion of the norm of good faith, the law reconfigures the
risks to create an epidemic of behavior compatible with the good faith
norm, and it does so by placing the necessary pressure in the appropriate
direction. That is, the law threatens the stick of punishment and, at mini-
mum, offers the carrot of lower mutual monitoring costs in an effort to gain
compliance. If the norm that directors should benefit personally from
inside information has been internalized, as was apparently the case before
the 1929 stock market crash,93 that norm is far from the tipping point and
great affirmative pressure will be needed to change it.
Consider, finally, the unincorporated businesses. Before the 1980s,
the norm that existed was a high standard from the good faith continuum,
reflecting the conflict and dominion of the actor-owner. Then RUPA
introduced a relatively contractarian flavor. 94 The push in favor of RUPA,
a uniform statute designed for state legislatures to adopt, reflects the norm
entrepreneurs' recognition of the importance of law as a tool for norm
formation.' To date, however, only eleven states have adopted RUPA as
92. Id. at 60. For example, when a customer begins to refuse to pay (perhaps by
claiming that the goods are defective), other customers will have an increasing incentive to
follow suit.
93. Directors do not "occupy the position of trustee toward individual stockholders in
the corporation." Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933). "Fiduciary obliga-
tions of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of experience and ability will be
deterred from accepting such office." Id. at 661.
94. See supra Part lIM.A.3 (comparing historical good faith norm in unincorporated
business forms to current developments).
95. A ftindamental modification in the existing norm for the standard of performance in
partnerships had to be accomplished by statute because of the partnership standard derived
from Section 21 of the UPA. See generally 2 ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG & RiBsTEIN ON PARTNERSIP § 6.07 (1995) (discussing fiduciary duty under UPA);
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the applicable partnership statute.96 Perhaps the power/conflict-based good
faith norm has been internalized with respect to partnerships. In contrast,
the astonishingly successful efforts to promote adoption of LLC statutes
prove the potential effectiveness of norm entrepreneurship through
statutes;' the LLC scenario impressively illustrates the use of statutes to
push through the tipping point. The norm entrepreneurs have effected a
massive defection from the good faith norm, in favor of a freedom-of-
contract norm that tends not to weigh dominance and conflict when estab-
lishing the standard of performance. 9 This rapid and apparently effortless
success may mean that the good faith continuum had not been internalized
for LLCs and that it was therefore near the tipping point. It may, instead,
reflect massive pressure brought to bear. 9 -
C. Law Propels a Pendulum
What have we learned so far? The norm of good faith animates
business law"° and is applied at levels determined by the actor's dominance
and conflict.101 The law in some cases supports the existing good faith
norm.102 The law can also act as a tipping agent and will, if successful,
CLAIRE MOORE DICKERSON, PARTNERSHIP LAW ADVISER 427 (1991) (discussing Section 21
of UPA).
96. See supra note 80 (discussing limited adoption of RUPA).
97. As of July 1996, all fifty-one jurisdictions have adopted an LLC statute. See Ellen
G. McGinris, Choosing the L.L.C. Form, in DRAFrING CoRPORATE AGREEMENTS: CONVERT-
ING THE DEAL INTO AN EFFECTIVE CONTRACT 189, 193-96 (Practising Law Institute 1996)
(compiling citations to all statutes except for Vermont's). Vermont passed its LLC statute on
June 1, 1996, effective July 1, 1996. Michael Burak, Vermonters Win with Limited Liability
Companies, VT. Bus. MAG., June 1, 1996, at 10. Before 1988, only two jurisdictions had
such a statute. Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 418 n.3 (1995). Just four
years ago, only eight states had such a statute. Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the
Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1995).
98. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (observing that LLC statutes tend to
lower standard of performance). If the business community interprets the contractarian support
of opting out to low standards of performance as a refusal to perceive dominance or conflict,
due to the assumption of a level playing field, the basis of any change worked by the new laws
will be on tolerance for dominance and conflict, rather than relative tolerance for abuse. The
impact may be slightly different because of the difference in focus, but the overall effect will
be tolerance.
99. Professor Ribstein suggests that lawyer groups have "initiated" LLC legislation and
"urged" it to enactment. Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories
and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 410-11 (1995).
100. See supra Part ll.A (discussing good faith norm in business relations).
101. See supra Part I.B (discussing good faith continuum).
102. See supra Part III.A (discussing role of law as supporter of existing good faith norm).
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modify the norm. 3 However, there is a further step. As the norm in
favor of the vulnerable becomes predominant - and especially as it is
progressively internalized - the law, by continuing to push in the same
direction as the norm, will ultimately reverse the positions of the relatively
powerful and the relatively vulnerable. For example, the pendulum can
explain what appears to be a fundamental change since 1995 in the direction
of insider trading law.
As described above, first came the years of norm expansion supporting
the public against the ills of insider trading."° Persons who do not have
material nonpublic information about a particular company, but are in a
position to have access to such information, are wary of investing in securi-
ties because of the difficulty of proving the negative. These investors know
that if the company engages in a transaction after the investors have traded
in the securities, it will be virtually impossible to prove that they did not
possess inside information. Technically, the prosecution or the SEC has the*
burden of proving that the defendant had the information. But the Motel
6 investigation, in which the SEC went to the seventh generation of alleged
tippee, indicates how aggressive the government is prepared to be in these
cases."°s In the tippee environment, the SEC seeks to establish a near
presumption that a person who receives information has asked where it
came from, thereby giving the defendant-recipient the necessary scienter to
be prosecuted if he or she does possess the information. This presumption
does not ease the government's need to prove that the alleged tippee had the
information, but the government's use of plea-bargaining encourages
alleged tippers to discuss everything with the SEC. 16 Consequently,
persons in the venture capital industry - those in the business of dealing
103. See supra Part lIH.B (discussing law as barrier to change and as engine of change).
104. See supra Part M.A.2 (discussing expansion of good faith norm to insider trading
context).
105. Floyd Norris, The Labyrinth of 2 Insider Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at
Dl. The SEC has been successful. The most recent judgment in the Motel 6 investigation
was for $3 million. S.E.C. Judgment in Motel 6 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1997, at 37.
106. See FISCHEL, supra note 60, at 101 (describing then U.S. Attorney Rudolf
Giuliani's announcement that Dennis Levine was cooperating). That does not necessarily
mean that the person in Levine's position would lie, that is, that the person would say that
information had been transferred when it had not. But plea bargaining is a powerful
weapon. Consider Ivan Boesky, for example, who agreed to be wired for sound, to have
his telephone tapped, and to have his office meetings videotaped as part of his arrangement
with the SEC. See James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Grand Jury Is Said to Be Probing
Drexel for Possible Criminal Securities Violations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 3; see
also Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of Investor Confidence,
16 HoFsmra L. REV. 665, 697 n.178 (1988) (concerning SEC's reasons for accepting pleas).
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in securities for their own account and for the account of others - fear to
trade even when they have no inside information, but rely purely on pub-
licly available information.107
Since 1995, two circuit courts of appeals and Congress have reacted
against this trend in favor of insider trading plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Bryan' and the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
O'Hagan'" have claimed that the misappropriation theory exceeds statutory
limits.' 0 According to these courts, the misappropriation theory fails in the
statutory context because the theory finds a violation even when no one
connected to the defendant's transaction has been deceived, and this in turn
results in a virtual guaranty of equal disclosure to all in the markets -
precisely the concept rejected by the Supreme Court in Chiarella."'
Although the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not articulated that an emerg-
ing tendency to abuse insiders with the misappropriation theory has moti-
vated their recent decisions, it is certain that these circuits, in breaking with
the Second, the Third, the Seventh, and the Ninth Circuits,"' have gener-
ated decisions hostile to the earlier shift towards a balance favoring securi-
ties law plaintiffs."'
107. See Technology Companies No Longer Fair Game, VENTuRE CAP. J., Jan. 1,
1996, at 15, 15 (discussing reprieve from securities fraud litigation granted by Reform Act).
For a general description of the risk, albeit in the context of state insider trading prohibi-
tions, see Curtis Vosti, Fund's Fx-Directors' Investments Probed; Washington State Appoints
Investigator, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 13, 1992, at 2, 39.
108. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995). In Bryan, the defen-
dant, as the West Virginia Lottery Director, learned information confidential to his employer
about bidders for the Lottery's video lottery business. See id. at 937-39. On the basis of
that information, the defendant traded in the bidders' shares. See id. at 939.
109. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 759 (1997). In O'Hagan, the defendant was a member of the law firm representing a
potential acquiror and traded in the target's securities. Id. at 614.
110. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (describing misappropriation theory).
111. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980); O'Hagan, 92 F.3d
at 621 (rejecting parity of information standard); Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (same).
112. See supra notes 66-69 (citing cases supporting misappropriation theory).
113. It is difficult to compare a legislative trend with a judicial trend. The legislature,
subject to the appropriate constitutional and political realities, can express its views -
including any hostility - directly. By contrast, when the courts deal with insidar trading,
they must consider the principles of statutory interpretation generally and of interpreting
securities statutes specifically. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (discussing conflicting rules for statutory interpreta-
tion); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the 'Central Bank of Denver Case', N.Y.
L.J., June 16, 1994, at 3 (discussing interpretive rules of construction applied in Central
Bank of Denver case). Nevertheless, to the extent that even Justice Scalia's new formal-
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Hostility to the pro-plaintiff shift, on the other hand, was an expressly
articulated reason for passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (Reform Act)."' This statute may have been badly drafted," 5
but its purpose is to restore balance. Private causes of action will be harder
to institute: the statute restricts class actions by requiring the court to
appoint a lead plaintiff."6 It makes private causes of action more risky for
the plaintiff's lawyers because it imposes mandatory sanctions in the event
of a violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). 17 It makes private
causes of action less rewarding for the private plaintiff by substituting
proportionate liability for joint and several liability, unless the plaintiff can
prove that the defendant acted not only with scienter but with actual knowl-
edge."3 As a practical matter, by making private causes of action more
difficult and more dangerous to instigate, the Reform Act limits who will
be a defendant." 9
ism and new textualism "potentially expands upon the judge's range of discretion by
his revival of the notoriously numerous and manipulable canons of construction," Eskridge,
supra, at 675, hostility may well show through even an assertedly plain meaning interpreta-
tion.
114. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act), Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (1994))
(amending 1934 Act). Title I of the Act is "Reduction of Abusive Litigation." 109 Stat.
at 737; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 730 (1995) ("The private securities
litigation system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this
system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive
and meritless suits.").
115. For example, the safe harbor applies only to private causes of action but not as
protection against the SEC - of what use is a safe harbor against only one group of
potential complainants? Note, however, that the SEC had previously promulgated, for
example, Rule 3b-6 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1996), which provides a
limited safe harbor for certain forward-looking statements made in good faith. In addition,
the judicial "bespeaks caution" doctrine seeks to achieve a similar result. See, for example,
the discussion of the doctrine in In re Numerex Corp. Securities Litigation, 913 F. Supp.
391, 396-402 (1996).
116. See Reform Act, sec. 101(b), § 21D, 109 Stat. at 743-49 (amending 1934 Act by
adding Section 21D and including presumption that lead plaintiff is plaintiff with "largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class").
117. Id. sec. 101(b), § 21D(c)(3), 109 Stat. at 748 (amending 1934 Act by adding Sec-
tion 21D(c)(3)).
118. Id. sec. 201, § 21D(g) (amending 1934 Act's new Section 21D). With proportion-
ate liability, the plaintiff no longer has the option of merely going after the deep pocket and
then leaving that defendant to seek to recoup from other violators of the 1934 Act's Section
10(b).
119. In the misrepresentation area, Reform Act Section 102 effects that result directly
by creating at least a limited safe harbor against certain private causes of action. See
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Therefore, these courts of appeals and congressional decisions since
1995 can be interpreted as a return swing of the pendulum.1 0 The previ-
ously dominant insiders have become relatively vulnerable because prior
law supported plaintiffs against insiders. The vectors of both the anti-
insider-trading norm and the law pushed in the same direction - across the
tipping point and into territory where the roles have now been reversed.
As perceived by these lawmakers, the newly vulnerable insiders are now
protected from the newly dominant public. Although seeking balance, the
law still supports the good faith norm.
What has been happening in the past ten years with respect to unincor-
porated businesses has also been a norm change supported by law, but
instead has been away from the good faith norm. The consequences remain
unclear. The push for adoption of statutes that lean toward opting out of
fiduciary duties with respect to partnerships first and then LLCs represents
an effort to create a new norm through a massive defection from the exist-
ing good faith norm. The efforts of these contractarian norm entrepreneurs
have overwhelmed the tipping point, at least as to LLCs, leading to an
extraordinarily rapid expansion of the contractarian concept. Although the
contractarian's norm creation efforts in favor of a new freedom-of-contract
norm reinforce defection from, rather than support of, the good faith norm,
the path traced has been the same as in the insider trading context. To the
extent that the good faith norm was internalized, reversal of the norm has
been more difficult than if the norm had not been internalized, and the
norm apparently has been more resistant in the context of partnerships than
Reform Act, sec. 102(b), § 21E, 109 Stat. at 753-56 (amending 1934 Act by adding Sec-
don 21E). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 (discussing Reform Act).
120. On November 5, 1996, California citizens voted decisively against the California
referendum item named Proposition 211. See Ballot Initiatives Around the Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B7 (noting that 74% of voting Californians voted against Proposi-
tion 211). The referendum would have reversed some of the Reform Act's effects by
making plaintiff class actions for securities fraud easier to bring in California. See Proposi-
tion 211, § 3, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 211 (West) (rejected). The rejection can be
interpreted as the public's expression in favor of the Reform Act's support of relatively
vulnerable insiders. In fairness, however, it is difficult to be clear about the public's
message given the heated rhetoric that preceded the referendum. See Neil Orman, Tech
Firms Rally Tough Against California's Prop. 211, AUSTIN Bus. J. (TEx.), Nov. 1, 1996,
at 3 (noting that Proposition 211 has national antibusiness tendencies); Don't Be Fooled by
Sales Job: Prop. 211 Written to Benefit Lawyers, Bus. J. (SAN JosE), Nov. 4, 1996, at 10
(asserting that Proposition 211 is pro-trial lawyer); Wall Street Investors Turning Attention
to National State Elections: Tech Companies Fight Proposition in California, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Nov. 3, 1996, at G4 (noting that Proposition 211 would limit disclosure by
management to shareholders).
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LLCs.'21 The critical question is: What will happen to the pro-freedom-of-
contract vectors, now that they have crossed the tipping point for destruc-
tion of the good faith norm in the context of LLCs, and as they continue to
push toward destruction of that norm in the context of partnerships?
This is where we are today. With respect to insider trading, the recent
changes in the law can be explained as a difference in perception that drives
the pendulum back for the overall purpose of supporting the norm of good
faith. The pendulum of the norm arguably has swung to its apex in support
of the public, and the law now has eased its support for those who were
perceived as vulnerable, but are now perceived as dominant. The insider-
trading law evolved at a time when the vectors of the good faith norm and
the law coerced and protected in opposite directions. The law was not
designed to have the vectors operating in the same direction, and so the
argument goes, a correction is now needed to respect the good faith norm
and to continue to protect those who are truly vulnerable. In contrast, with
respect to unincorporated businesses, it is much more difficult to see the
changes as supporting the vulnerable against the dominant. Instead, these
changes support norm defectors who destroy the good faith norm in the
unincorporated business context. What remains unclear in the unincorpo-
rated business arena is whether the new freedom-of-contract norm has so
far swamped the old good faith norm as to create its own pendulum, or
whether it can still be driven back to swing on the pendulum of the over-
arching norm of good faith, assuming that the contractarians' perceptions
are indeed misguided.
What we have seen already, however, is that law can be a very power-
ful tool in support of an existing norm, and we have seen hints of its power
to expand or reverse a norm. Given the potential impact of law when it
interacts with norms, we must consider when it is defensible for the law to
intervene in these ways. In particular, we must consider whether it is
appropriate for the law to support the vulnerable at the expense of the actor
who has both dominance and conflict. This exploration is especially
important with respect to unincorporated businesses because it is not at all
clear that the pendulum has begun righting itself in this context. What
should the role of law be?
121. As of July 1996, only eleven states have adopted RUPA. See supra note 80
(discussing limited adoption of RUPA). The adoption of LLC statutes has been by fire-
storm. See supra note 97 (noting widespread adoption of LLC statutes). See generally
supra Part mI.A.3 (observing RUPA and LLC statutes' trend away from good faith norm).
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IV. The Good Faith Norm Is to Be Enforced:
It Is Part of the Commons
Part H.B re-emphasized my earlier analysis that the standard of perfor-
mance reflected in case law tracks a formula that assesses, among other
criteria, the actor's conflict of interest and relative dominance. 1" This
concept of a standard on the good faith continuum is an excellent vehicle
to discuss the appropriateness of enforcement. The standard is a norm, as
discussed above, and does not rely exclusively on its power as a norm for
enforcement - it is in fact reinforced by law. For example, contract law
and commercial law expressly enforce a requirement of good faith perform-
ance, 12 and business law imposes a standard of performance at least as
high.1
4
A. It Is Defensible for Laws to Protect the Good Faith Norm if
It Is Part of the Commons
It is one thing to contend that the laws interface with the norm of good
faith. It is quite another to claim that because the relevant norm entrepre-
neurs believe that the community ought to conform to the particular norm,
the norm is defensible on moral grounds. The fact that good faith is a
122. This is true even if described as a rejection of opportunism. See supra Part .B
(discussing good faith norm in relation to efficiency arguments). The major difference
between antiopportunism and good faith is that the former's focus is to protect society by
protecting efficiency, see supra notes 14-15, where the latter's focus may be to protect the
other participant in the transaction as well, see generally Dickerson, supra note 16 (analyz-
ing good faith continuum from weaker party's viewpoint). See Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976) (discuss-
ing standards versus rules); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in
Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1682-88 (1990) (defining corporate fiduciary
relationship); cf William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure
of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1084, 1099 (1993) (noting that Amer-
ican Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
may dilute fiduciary duties-because, if disinterested directors decide, morals of marketplace
"will henceforth determine the context of 'fairness,'" thereby impliedly removing added
protection of standards).
123. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992) (imposing good faith standard on, inter alia, perfor-
mance of any "contract or duty" under UCC); id. § 2-103(1)(b) (defining good faith, in
relation to the sale of goods in a commercial setting, as "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTREA'S § 205 (1979) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); Dickerson, supra note 16, at 979-
85 (discussing application of good faith continuum by commercial law found either at
common law or in UCC).
124. See generally Dickerson, supra note 16 (analyzing good faith norm of business law
in relation to other areas of law).
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norm does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that this norm should be
enforced. That is the greatest difficulty with the analysis of the Communi-
tarians. The problem, of course, is that the relevant community may have
a perfectly loathsome norm. When Amitai Etzioni, the father of Communi-
tarianism, dealt with the problem of a police state that implicitly has its own
norms, he lamely indicated that certain norms are so offensive that we must
turn to higher order values, without explaining how to justify the definitiQn
of reprehensible that is adopted. 11 Repression of identified minorities was
a factual norm in Germany before and during World War II. I have no'
difficulty in recognizing it as a norm that ought to give way to higher order
values. However, I need additional tools to explain this recognition and to
predict when it will occur.
As noted in Part II, the standard on the good faith continuum is a norm
in the business-commercial context as a factual matter, and schools from very
different perspectives have (grudgingly, in some cases) accepted that good
faith ought to be a norm. It is not merely that they, as norm entrepreneurs,
think others should conform. Rather, they believe that, as a value, some
level of good faith is preferable to bad faith. Even the lawyer-economists
approve mandating nonopportunistic (non-bad faith) behavior because they
consider opportunistic behavior to be inefficient. Essentially, they object to
the actor externalizing costs by ultimately imposing the costs on society.
Although shifting of costs is a problem, this is a weak, calculating tool for
determining that a systematic repression is indeed indefensible. 1 The
realists tend toward positivism and approve the good faith norm because it
exists. The realists focus on what is not bad faith and, arguably, on avoiding
bad faith rather than on adhering to good faith. 'I The problem with all these
explanations is that they are negative. At best, therefore, they explain why
persons should not behave opportunistically or in bad faith. They do not
explain affirmatively why actors should behave in accordance with the good
faith norm, that is, why the vulnerable should be protected, and why the law
should affirmatively enforce the good faith standard.
125. See ElzmoNi, supra note 62, at 37 (discussing higher order values).
126. To my mind, one of the most convincing illustrations of how incomplete an
explanation calculativeness and opportunism offer is (inadvertently) contained in Oliver
Williamson's effort to apply the former in a context clearly outside the business arena:
sexual assault. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organiza-
don, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 465 (1993). For a discussion of the interrelatedness of trust and
calculation, see Bratton, supra note 32, at 165.
127. See Summers, supra note 10, at 196 (asserting that good faith "is a phrase which
has no general meaning of its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms
of bad faith").
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A positive way to approach the minimum mandatory standard of good
faith in the business-commercial context is to think of the good faith norm
as part of the commons. We usually think of the commons in the context of
environmental law, particularly when considering nonrenewable resources.
The commons, for example, include the ocean and the atmosphere. 11 Both
the ocean and the atmosphere contain nonrenewable resources, at least to the
extent that the resources are expended faster than they can be renewed. 129
When there are nonrenewable resources, the incentive to act as a free rider
is potent: If a person harvests one more whale, cuts down one more rain
forest tree, or pours into the atmosphere one more cubic meter of pollutants,
that person appropriates one whole unit of the common good, but shares in
only an infinitesimal part of the resultant cost. The other owners of the
commons, together, bear the vast majority of the cost.
But wait. Why assume that the good faith norm is part of the com-
mons? It may be tempting, instead, to consider that the good faith norm is
infinitely renewable and, therefore, a pure public good. 130 The argument
would be that, unlike the commons, 1 the good faith norm does not dimin-
128. Although some still refer to the ocean and the atmosphere as public goods, see
DANIEL C. EsTY, THE GREENING OF GATT: TRADE, ENvIRoNMENT, AND THE FuTURE 67
(1994), it is hard to see them as infinitely abundant today, see Individual Actions and
Collective Consequences, introduction to RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 19, 31
(Brian Barry & Russell Hardin eds., 1982). For purposes of this Article, no one can be
excluded from the benefits of a "pure public good," and it is infinitely abundant - a
sidewalk that has just been cleaned, for example. See Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in
the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 388 (1996) (describing pure public goods). The relevant commu-
nity is therefore in a state of "plenitude" with respect to a pure public good. See Carol M.
Rose, "Enough, and as Good" of that?, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 417, 426 (1987) (defining
"plenitude" as state in which there is not perceived scarcity). It is hard to conceive of a
truly pure public good. Even the example of a recently cleaned sidewalk arguably may not
be a truly pure public good; each dirty step is akin to the pollution described in Part IV.B
of this Article. In any event, neither the ocean nor the atmosphere could be a pure public
good under this rigorous definition.
129. Definitions are still fluid. Perhaps a renewable resource (or at least a nonexclusive
one) can be a public good, see Paul B. Stephan, Im, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public
Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745, 749-50
(1995) (discussing public goods), but there the focus is not on one person making uncompen-
sated use of a common asset. Rather, the focus is on the lack of any one party's incentive
to create the common good, because that one person obtains only a fraction of the resultant
benefit and grants the benefit to others. See supra note 128 (defining pure public good).
130. See supra note 128 (defining pure public good).
131. Persons can be partially excluded from common pool resources that are not
infinitely abundant (for example, international freshwater). See Benvenisti, supra note 128,
at 388. The "impure public good" is similar because it is not infinitely abundant, but no one
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ish in value as it is used.' We even could argue that good faith increases
in vitality as it is used (that is, respected), because the norm is thus
strengthened. Part IV.B shows, however, that the good faith norm is
nonrenewable, and that its destruction harms all participants in the business
arena. The systematic failure to act in accordance with the good faith
standard is not merely opportunism (as the lawyer-economists say); it is the
destruction of part of the commons' and, for that reason, is indefensible."U
The protection of the commons will then be the positive goal.
B. The Good Faith Norm Is Part of the Commons:
The Law Should Support It
If the atmosphere or the ocean represents the quintessence of the
commons, then to the extent that the good faith norm shares with the
atmosphere or the ocean those elements that define them as the commons,
the norm can be considered the commons, too. Thus, the good faith norm
must be of a nature that it can be abused by one person, with the effect that
the abuse imposes costs on all others. Also, good faith must be nonrenew-
able.
Good faith can be compared to an ocean on the one hand and to the
atmosphere on the other. When I use the image of an ocean, I focus on the
analogy between defectors from the good faith norm and persons who
overuse the ocean's resources - by overfishing, for example.Y"5 When I
use the image of the atmosphere, I focus instead on the analogy between
can be excluded from it (for example, open ocean fisheries). Id. For purposes of this Arti-
cle, I consider both together and, therefore, both to be in the commons. Both are subject
to Professor Garrett Hardin's so-called tragedy of the commons. See generally Benvenisti,
supra note 128, at 388 (applying "tragedy of the commons" problem to, impure public goods
and common pool resources); Garrett J. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968) (arguing that tragedy befalls mbst common resources).
132. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 116-17 (1982)
(discussing increase in value of some public goods in inclusive groups).
133. The failure to comport with the good faith standard can be described as a "public
bad." See Robert Cameron Mitchell, National Environmental Lobbies and the Apparent
Illogic of Collective Action, in COLLECnVE DECISION MAKING: APPLICATIONS FROM PUBLIC
CHOIcE THEORY 87, 99 (C. Russell ed., 1979) (distinguishing "public goods" from "public
bads").
134. See supra text accompanying note 46 (discussing incentive to act opportunistically).
135. Overfishing is an example of overuse of the ocean's resources. See James M.
Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited, in THE QUESTION OF THE CoMMONS 37 (Bonnie J.
McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987); see also ESTY, supra note 128, at 15, Fig. 1.1
(discussing declining fishing harvests caused by overfishing). But see id. at 17-18 n.7
(referring to ocean pollution).
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defectors and polluters." 6 Taking the overfishing analogy first, it is rela-
tively straightforward to understand why one person should not use up an
asset of general benefit that is located in the commons. If we consider that
norm defectors use up a supply of good will and trust when they act below
the good faith standard, the analogy is complete. Those who have dealt
with the norm defectors and those who have heard of the norm defectors'
dealings will have less confidence in the good faith norm because, after that
bad experience, they will be unsure how others will behave. Therefore, by
behaving according to a standard below the good faith norm, the defectors
have obtained a benefit and have eroded the existing norm."
The pollution image, on the other hand, carries with it the difficult
analogy of the polluter located on private property rather than in the com-
mons. The good faith norm easily fits this difficult analogy if we consider
a breach of the duty of good faith in a particular contract. However, even
if we view the contract in a nineteenth-century fashion (that is, as being a
one-off, private relationship between two isolated participants) and seek
thereby to consider the mandatory good faith provision to be the contracting
parties' asset, the obstacle is not insurmountable. Inherent in environmental
law is the understanding that the collective whole, where it is adversely
affected by the actions of one person, can regulate that person's activities,
especially if the effect of those activities reaches beyond the actor's own
property.'38 The question is whether we can show that one person's viola-
tion of the norm of good faith in even the most isolated contract between
two willing participants adversely affects the community at large.'39 The
answer is that, by acting in violation of the good faith norm, the contracting
136. E.g., ESTY, supra note 128, at 15 (discussing problem of polluters). But it is
possible to think of animals (including humans) as using up oxygen, especially as the
rainforests dwindle. See id. (advocating shift of focus from big industries to individual
behavior).
137. See FRANCIs FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPEmrTY 150 (1995) (noting that United States has tendency toward "social atomization"
and that looking out for individual interests can explain United States' loss of social capital
during last fifty years).
138. See ESTY, supra note 128, at 52 (asserting that harm to neighbors trumps sover-
eignty concerns).
139. See Benvenisti, supra note 128, at 388 (discussing common pools); see also H.
Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124, 134-35 (1954) (observing that baronial manor had commons that were
regulated, and that although common property is not sufficiently valued, it can be success-
fully regulated by such rules as "bag limit per man"). For a discussion of the commons as
a testing ground for norms, see Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1740-43 (1996).
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party is similar to a factory owner whose factory is located entirely on the
owner's property but pollutes all the atmosphere. If people act according
to a standard lower than good faith, they pollute the commons by infecting
the good faith norm. Those who witness the effects of the defection will
tend to become less trusting. Applying this principle systematically, the
efforts of a determined norm defector, and especially the efforts of norm
defectors acting in concert, can destroy the existing norm - in this case the
norm of good faith"4 - just as surely as the classic polluter destroys the
atmosphere.
Based on either analogy, then, the efforts of the norm defectors leave
those with whom they have dealt and those who have heard of their deal-
ings with a diminished incentive to behave according to the good faith
standard. Thus, the norm effectively is eroded."' If we allow these raiders
to erode the good faith norm, they are - as the lawyer-economists would
say - increasing agency costs, and transaction costs generally, for the
entire community. 42 In other words, because norm entrepreneurship is
effective, and because good faith is a part of the commons, norm entrepre-
neurs should not be allowed to arrogate that resource to themselves and
thereby to erode this norm. Because defection will spread like an epidemic,
the consequence of uncensored defection can be dramatic.
Hence, a role for law. Part of the law's function in supporting the
norm of good faith is to stabilize the norm against the raider-style norm
entrepreneurs." Not only does law play that role, but also law should
support the good faith norm as part of the commons. In fact, law should
do more than merely support. The 1934 Act expanded the good faith
norm, and the Second," 4 Third, 45 Seventh, 46 and Ninth 47 Circuits fur-
140. See supra Part M.A.1 (stating that law supports good faith against defectors); see
also AXELROD, supra note 1, at 160-63 (commenting that raider can invade if nice
strategy - here, good faith - is not territorially stable); supra Part M.A-B (discussing
law's role in protecting, modifying, abandoning, and replacing norms).
141. Professor Garrett Hardin discussed the overuse of natural resources on the one
hand, and pollution on the other, as the two scenarios that define the tragedy of the com-
mons. Hardin, supra note 131, at 1244-45.
142. Trust reduces transaction costs. See FUKUYAmA, supra note 137, at 27 (asserting
that trust reduces costs of doing business).
143. See supra Part m.C (stating that, in effect, laws are tempering norm entrepre-
neurs' impact); see also AXELROD, supra note 1, at 155 (asserting that government must
maintain tough reputation and must elicit compliance from majority of governed by making
obedience preferable).
144. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
145. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd on remand,
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thered the expansion by applying the misappropriation theory to nondisclo-
sure cases under Section 10(b). Arguably, even the recent Fourth1" and
Eighth149 Circuit decisions that rejected the misappropriation theory, as well
as the new congressional restriction on private securities litigation, are in
support of the good faith norm."u
With respect to unincorporated businesses, the image is less clear.
Although the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 and its gloss support the
good faith norm, RUPA has weakened it. To the extent that the good faith
norm has not been destroyed, the pendulum may yet right itself. There-
fore, the good faith norm may still be relatively intact with respect to
partnerships. However, if the contractarian norm entrepreneurs have
pushed their norm defection past the tipping point, they will have invaded
and destroyed the good faith norm. With respect to LLCs in particular and
unincorporated businesses in general, this may be the case. Destruction of
the good faith norm is destruction of the commons. It is time to reverse the
process.
V. Conclusion
The good faith norm that sweeps between contract law's good faith and
trust law's fiduciary duty is the standard of performance that applies
throughout business law. Although good faith is a norm, the law supports
and modifies it. When the law's support of the good faith norm becomes
too effective, the relatively vulnerable party becomes dominant. It is then
that the law will shift to protect the newly vulnerable in obedience to the
overarching principle of good faith, as is arguably the case in certain areas
concerning insider trading.
However, norm defectors can destroy the good faith norm. Any
person who uses the law to create a new norm is, by definition, eroding the
old norm. In the context of unincorporated businesses, evidence indicates
that there has been a creeping destruction of the good faith norm, whether
or not that is the intention. To the extent that the freedom-of-contract
standard, as contemplated by the new unincorporated business statutes, fails
808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986).
146. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995).
147. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995).
149. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 759 (1997).
150. See supra Part ]II.C (observing that insider trader law supports good faith norm).
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to consider the relative dominance and vulnerability of the parties, those
statutes are instruments of norm defection.
Because the norm of good faith is part of the commons, destruction of
the norm is destruction of the commons. Therefore, we must reverse the
unincorporated business statutes' opposition to the good faith norm. The
good faith norm must be protected and reinvigorated in the context of
partnerships, and an unapologetic good faith norm applicable to partner-
ships must become the basis for interpreting the standards applicable to
other unincorporated forms, particularly the LLC. To allow the continued
emergence of the freedom-of-contract norm, now apparently ascendant
among LLCs, will further destroy the commons that is the good faith norm.
